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Abstract
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among
the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space.
The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and
relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games.
We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV ). We characterize
the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone
and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we
construct a weighted OSV as well.
JEL Classification numbers: C72, D50, D63.
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1 Introduction
A feature common to most economic environments is that the interaction among agents,
be it through exchange, production or both, generates benefits shared among the partici-
pating individuals. The question of what would be the resulting distribution of gains has
been central to economic theory. In this paper, we propose and analyze a new solution
concept (sharing method) that satisfies appealing properties in economic environments.
In economic environments characterized by transferable utility (TU ), where there
exists a “numeraire” commodity that all agents value the same in terms of utility, there are
several popular notions of the distribution of gains, the most well-known of which are the
Core and the Shapley value. These satisfy several desirable properties such as efficiency
and group stability in the case of the core, and efficiency, fairness and consistency for the
Shapley value.
Extending the notion of the Core to more general environments with non-transferable
utility (NTU ) is straightforward. However, the extension of the central concept of the
Shapley value turns out to be a much more demanding task. The three known exten-
sions describe the environment in the utility space, i.e., specifying feasible utility tuples,
abstracting from the physical environment generating the tuples. They associate with
each environment one or more TU games, and use their Shapley value to generate a
surplus sharing method. To define such a method, Shapley (1969) associates with each
environment a TU game, by means of a weights vector, giving the “worth” of each utility
tuple. This TU game has a well-defined Shapley value. If this value is feasible for the
original game, it is a utility profile associated with this environment. Harsanyi (1959)
suggests a different extension, by stressing the idea of equity. His solution contains the
notion of coalitional “dividends” and each agent must end up with a payoff corresponding
to the sum of his dividends. Finally, Maschler and Owen (1989) and (1992), using a TU
game associated with the grand coalition, provide an extension preserving the consistency
properties of the Shapley value.
A major shortcoming of the extensions of the Shapley value is that the solutions
are not invariant to order-preserving transformations of the agents’ utilities. The notion
of invariance has been addressed in the literature in two different ways. One approach
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considers bargaining problems, where the environment is given by the utility possibilities
frontier for the whole set of agents and the disagreement point. A solution is then said to
be ordinal, if it is invariant with respect to strictly increasing monotonic transformations
of these entities. Shapley (1969) shows that there does not exist an ordinal, efficient and
anonymous solution for the case of two agents, and constructs one for the three-agent case.
Safra and Samet (2004) provide a family of ordinal, efficient and anonymous solutions for
bargaining problems with any number of agents greater than two.
The second approach towards the ordinality issue considers the underlying physical
environment generating the utility possibilities frontier. This approach better captures
the basic structure of the environment since identical economic environments may lead to
drastically different bargaining problems, by appropriate choices of utility functions that
represent the same preferences. In this approach the solution is defined in terms of the
physical environment, i.e., in terms of allocations of commodity bundles.
To clarify the difference between the two approaches, take the example of a two-agent
exchange economy. Consider the representation of this economy as an NTU game. Fol-
lowing Shapley (1969) there is no ordinal, efficient and anonymous solution concept for
this game. However, there are several ordinal, efficient and anonymous solution concepts
for the exchange economy such as the competitive equilibrium, the core and others. There-
fore, an ordinal solution for the economic environment need not be an ordinal solution for
the NTU game. Similarly, an ordinal NTU solution need not be ordinal if analyzed as a
solution for the economic environment.
Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) provide a family of ordinal solutions given by Pareto-
Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent (PEEE) allocations for exchange economies. They con-
sider the problem of allocating a bundle of goods among a set of agents. In their envi-
ronment, each of the agents has the same a priori rights. An allocation is PEEE if it is
Pareto efficient and fair, in the sense that there exists a fixed commodity bundle (the same
for each agent) such that each agent is indifferent between this bundle and what he gets in
the allocation. McLean and Postlewaite (1989) consider pure exchange economies as well,
and define an ordinal solution given by nucleolus allocations, extending the notion of the
nucleolus defined for TU games in Schmeidler (1969). Nicolò and Perea (2004) also start
from the physical environment, and provide ordinal solutions for the case of two agents
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that, under some conditions, also extend to environments with any number of agents.
Our work continues this line of research by proposing an ordinal solution based on the
physical environment. This new solution incorporates several of the principles underlying
the Shapley value in TU environments, and will be referred to as the Ordinal Shapley
Value (OSV ). It generalizes the fairness notion (of PEEE) by considering possibly dif-
ferent a priori rights (i.e., different initial endowments), and also the options agents have
in any possible subgroup, and not just their own initial endowments. It is consistent in
the sense that agents’ payoffs are based on what they would get according to this rule
when applied to sub-environments. In addition to these properties of equity and consis-
tency, the solution is efficient, monotonic, anonymous, and satisfies individual rationality.
Also, the OSV is characterized through the use of “coalitional dividends” similar to the
characterization of the Shapley value by the use of Harsanyi dividends (Harsanyi, 1959).
The OSV exists whenever preferences are continuous and monotonic. No convexity
restrictions common in the specification of NTU games are necessary. It provides a
reasonable outcome for a large class of environments even where competitive equilibria or
core allocations may fail to exist.
In the next Section we start by reviewing the Shapley value in TU environments.
In Section 3 we describe the pure exchange economy underlying the NTU environment
and introduce the OSV , building on the characterization of the Shapley value for TU
environments provided in the previous section. In Section 4 we analyze the OSV for
two-agent economies and compare it to exiting constructions. In Section 5, we prove that
the OSV exists and furthermore it is individually rational. In Section 6, we start by
proving the construction of the OSV satisfies a symmetry property. We then proceed
to characterize the OSV via coalitional dividends, and provide further properties of the
solution. In Section 7, we show how to generate a family of weighted OSV s, providing an
ordinal analogue to the weighted Shapley values for TU environments. In Section 8, we
conclude and discuss further directions of research.
3
2 The Shapley Value in TU environments: A New
Characterization
Consider a Transferable Utility (TU ) game (N, v), where N = {1, ..., n} is the set of
players, and v : 2N → R is a characteristic function satisfying v(∅) = 0, where ∅ is the
empty set. For a coalition S ⊆ N, 1 v(S) represents the total payoff that the partners in
S can jointly obtain if this coalition is formed. We define a value as a mapping ξ which
associates with every game (N, v) a vector in Rn that satisfies
P
i∈N ξi(N, v) = v(N).
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The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953a) of every agent i ∈ N in the TU game (N, v) is
(denoting |S| the cardinality of the subset S):
φi(N, v) =
X
S⊆N\i
|S|!(n− |S|− 1)!
n!
[v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)].
The next theorem provides a new characterization of the Shapley value.3
Theorem 1 A value ξ is the Shapley value if and only if it satisfies:X
i∈N\j
(ξi(N, v)− ξi(N\j, v)) =
X
i∈N\j
(ξj(N, v)− ξj(N\i, v)) (1)
for all (N, v) with |N | ≥ 2 and for all j ∈ N.
Proof. To prove that the Shapley value satisfies the equality note that (1) is equivalent
(rearranging terms and using
P
i∈N ξi(N, v) = v(N)) to:
ξj(N, v) =
1
n
[v(N)− v(N\j)] + 1
n
X
i∈N\j
ξj(N\i, v). (2)
It is easy to check that the Shapley value satisfies (2). (This equality has been previously
used by Maschler and Owen (1989) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989).)
Furthermore suppose that equality (1), equivalently (2), is satisfied by the value ξ, for
all j ∈ N and for all (N, v). Since (2) provides a unique recursive way of calculating ξ
1Throughout the paper, we use ⊆ to denote the weak inclusion and ⊂ to denote the strict inclusion.
2Thus we require efficiciency as part of the definition of a value.
3When using the symbol (M,v) where v is a priori defined on N ⊇M , v is taken to be the restriction
of the original v to 2M .
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starting with ξi({i}, v) = v({i}), it characterizes the Shapley value, which completes the
proof.
The expression φi(N, v)−φi(N\j, v) is usually referred to as the contribution of player
j to the Shapley value of player i. It corresponds to the amount that makes player i
indifferent between receiving the value suggested to him in the game (N, v), or receiving
this payment and reapplying the value concept to the game without player j. Theorem
1 states that a value is the Shapley value if and only if, for any player j, the sum of the
contributions of player j to the other players is equal to the sum of the contributions of
the other players to player j.
We refer to the difference φi(N, v)−φi(N\j, v) as a concession, what player j concedes
to player i, and denote it by cji .
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Corollary 1 A value ξ is the Shapley value if and only if for each game (N, v) with
|N | ≥ 2 there exists a matrix of concessions c(N, v) ≡ (cij(N, v))i,j∈N,i6=j, with cij(N, v) in
R for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, such that:
(1) ξi(N, v) = ξi(N\j, v) + cji (N, v) for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, and
(2)
P
i∈N\j
cji (N, v) =
P
i∈N\j
cij(N, v) for all j ∈ N.
We can view part (1) in Corollary 1 as a consistency property of the Shapley value.
When the n − 1 players other than j consider the value offered to them by the solution
concept, they contemplate what might happen if they decide to go on their own. However,
the resources at their disposal should incorporate rents they could conceivably achieve by
cooperating with j. We call these rents the concessions of j to the other players. Part
(2) can be interpreted as a fairness requirement: the concessions balance out, the sum of
concessions one player makes to the others equals the sum of concessions the others make
to him.
We now briefly describe some characteristics of the concessions.
For aTU game (N, v), for any coalition S ⊆ N, let the gamewS be the unanimity game
(i.e., wS(T ) = 1 if T ⊇ S,wS(T ) = 0 otherwise). It is well known that the characteristic
function v can be written as linear combination of unanimity games: v =
P
S⊆N αSwS.
4See also Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), where concessions are interpreted as bids.
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Denoting λS = αS|S| for all S ⊆ N, the Shapley value can be written (see Harsanyi, 1959)
as:
φi(N, v) =
X
S3i
S⊆N
λS for all i ∈ N. (3)
It follows that:
cji (N, v) =
X
S3i,j
S⊆N
λS for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j.
An immediate implication of the previous equality is that, in TU games, the concessions
are symmetric in the sense that what player j concedes to i is the same as what player i
concedes to j. The symmetry of the concessions corresponds to the balanced contributions
property (see Myerson (1980)).
Another interesting property of the concessions is that, although they can in general
be positive of negative, they are always non-negative if the game is convex. The game
(N, v) is convex if, for all S, T ⊆ N with S ⊂ T and i /∈ T we have:
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ).
Next proposition states the result.
Proposition 1 If the TU game (N, v) is convex, all the concessions cji (N, v) are non-
negative.
Proof. The concession cji (N, v) = φi(N, v)− φi(N\j, v) is the difference between the
Shapley value of agent i in the game with all the agents and agent i’s Shapley value in
the game without agent j. Sprumont (1990) showed that for convex games the Shapley
value is a population monotonic allocation scheme. Each agent’s Shapley value increases
as the coalition to which he belongs expands. Thus, φi(N, v)− φi(N\j, v) ≥ 0 and hence
the concessions are non-negative.
To complete the section, we point out that a value can be expressed in terms of the
“Harsanyi dividends” (they are also called coalitional dividends), given in equation (3) if
and only if it is the Shapley value. We return to this characterization when analyzing the
properties of our proposal.
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Proposition 2 A value ξ is the Shapley value if and only if, for any game (N, v) there
exists λS ∈ R for all S ⊆ N such that,
ξi(T, v) =
X
S3i
S⊆T
λS for all i ∈ T, for all T ⊆ N . (4)
Proof. The fact that the Shapley value satisfies this property was shown by Harsanyi
(1959) and it is stated in (3). To show the sufficiency we note that (4) implies that ξ is
an egalitarian solution and hence must be the Shapley value (see Mas-Colell, Whinston
and Green (1995, pp. 680-681) for the definition of an egalitarian solution and the fact it
coincides with the Shapley value).
3 The Environment and the Solution
We consider a pure exchange economy with a set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of agents and k ≥
2 commodities. Agent i ∈ N is described by {ºi, wi}, where wi ∈ Rk is the vector
of initial endowments and ºi is the preference relation defined over Rk. An economy
(usually denoted by E) is thus given by E = {ºi, wi}ni=1. We denote by Âi and ∼i the
strict preference and indifference relationships associated with ºi. For each i ∈ N , the
preference relation ºi is assumed to be continuous and monotonic on Rk (i.e., if yl > xl
for all l = 1, ..., k, then y Âi x). To simplify the notation in several definitions and proofs
it would be convenient to refer to a utility function representing the preferences of agent
i, denoted by ui. For concreteness we map each commodity bundle x to the (unique)
number ui(x) that satisfies x ∼i ui(x) · e, where e ≡ (1, ..., 1) ∈ Rk. Such a number
exists since preferences are monotonic and continuous. As we define an ordinal solution
concept, the solution itself will, of course, not depend upon this particular choice of a
utility function.
We let w ≡
P
i∈N
wi. The set of feasible utility profiles in Rn for an economy E is denoted
by A(E) and defined by:
A(E) =
(
u ∈ Rn|∃ ¡xi¢
i=1,...,n
∈ Rkn, such that ui(xi) = ui, i = 1, ..., n and
X
i∈N
xi ≤ w
)
.
Agents can conceivably be better off by reallocating their initial endowments. However, it
should not be possible for the utility of one agent to grow arbitrarily large if the utilities
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of the other agents are bounded from below. To capture this idea, we assume that, for any
u ∈ A(E) and i ∈ N, the set Ai(u) ≡ {u ∈ A|u−i = u−i} is bounded from above.5 We note
that this property is ordinal, if it is satisfied for the ui we have constructed it also holds
for any strictly monotone transformation of it. In this paper, any pure exchange economy
that satisfies the previous requirements is referred to as an economic environment.
We propose a solution concept, called the Ordinal Shapley Value (OSV ), for pure
exchange economies, the construction of which relies on the notion of concessions. How-
ever, since these economies constitute NTU environments, which are described in terms
of the underlying physical structure, concessions cannot be in the form of utility transfers.
Concessions are expressed in terms of commodities. We measure them in terms of a “ref-
erence bundle” which we take to be e. The main characteristic of the concept proposed is
that it is ordinal. That is, the solution associates with each economy a set of allocations
that does not depend on the numerical representation of the underlying preferences of the
agents. Moreover, the solution proposed is efficient and satisfies consistency and fairness
requirements.
What is a “fair” and “consistent” sharing? Let us first discuss the rationale of our
proposal in the case of two agents. According to our proposal, a sharing is fair if the gains
from cooperation are equally distributed among the two agents. A crucial question is
how to measure these gains. In our proposal, the benefits from cooperation are measured
in terms of e. The gain of each agent is the amount of e units that when added to his
initial endowment, yields a bundle indifferent to the bundle received by the sharing. This
amount of e assumes the role of the difference in values (in the TU case).
A sharing is consistent if each agent is indifferent between the sharing outcome and
what he could get if he were to walk away and keep what remains of the aggregate
endowment, after compensating the other agent according to the solution concept. We
measure the surplus he can keep by the maximal amount of e units for which, when he
receives a bundle indifferent to his initial endowment augmented by that amount of e
units, the other agent is left with a bundle equivalent to the bundle he received in the
sharing. To state these properties more succinctly we use the notion of a concession just
as in the TU case. An efficient sharing is fair and consistent if there exists a pair of
5For a vector x ∈ Rn and i ∈ N , x−i ≡ (x1,...,xi−1,xi+1,...,xn}.
8
concessions such that the concession made by agent i to agent j equals the concession
made by agent j to agent i, and each agent is indifferent between keeping this allocation
or taking the concession proposed by the other (to add to his initial endowment).
Extending this notion to the n-person case, a solution is an efficient allocation for which
there exists a matrix of concessions, one from each agent to any other agent, satisfying
consistency and fairness. The consistency property now requires that any set of (n − 1)
agents should be indifferent between keeping their allocation or taking the concessions
made by the remaining agent and reapplying the solution concept to the (n − 1)-agent
economy. The recursive nature of the definition implies that this consistency property
extends to coalitions of any size. Moreover, to ensure that the allocation reached is
“fair”, we require the concessions to balance out, in the sense that the sum of concessions
one player makes to the others equals the sum of concessions the others make to him. In
other words, the surplus generated for any set of n− 1 agents is the same as the surplus
they are willing to concede to the remaining agent.
The formal definition of this solution concept, the OSV , is as follows:
Definition 1 The Ordinal Shapley Value is defined recursively.
(n = 1) In the case of an economy with one agent with preferences º1 and initial
endowments a1 ∈ Rk, the OSV is given by the initial endowment: OSV (º1, a1) = {a1} .
For n ≥ 2, suppose that the solution has been defined for any economy with (n− 1) or
less agents.
(n) In the case of an economy (ºi, ai)i∈N with a set N of n agents, the OSV ((ºi, ai)i∈N)
is the set of efficient allocations (xi)i∈N for which there exists an n−tuple of concession
vectors (ci)i∈N , ci ∈ Rn−1 for all i ∈ N that satisfy:
n.1) for all j ∈ N, there exists y(j) ∈ OSV
¡
(ºi, ai + cjie)i∈N\j
¢
such that xi ∼i y(j)i
for all i ∈ N\j, and
n.2)
P
i∈N\j
cji =
P
i∈N\j
cij for all j ∈ N.
It should be noted that the choice of the bundle e to measure the surplus that accrues
to each agent is arbitrary. The OSV could be constructed by using any other positive
vector.6 The following analysis is valid regardless of the particular reference bundle chosen.
6Given this fact, it may be more appropriate to use the notation OSVe instead of OSV . We use
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Note also that this solution concept reduces to the Shapley value in economic envi-
ronments that can be described as a TU environment. In such environments there is
a common unit of account which can be thought of as money, and agents’ preferences
are (normalized) quasi linear of the form m + vi(x) where m is “money”, vi is a utility
function, and x is a commodity vector. If we measure concessions in terms of money (m),
our solution yields the Shapley value.
4 The solution in a two-agent economy
For a two-agent economy (E), an OSV is an efficient allocation for which there exists an
identical concession for each agent, such that any agent is indifferent between the bundle
offered to him in the allocation or taking the concession and staying on his own.
In order to characterize a solution (xi)i=1,2 in the two-agent economy, notice first
that, by efficiency, the bundle of player 1, x1, must be the best for him among all the
allocations that leave agent 2 indifferent or better off than the bundle x2.Moreover, agent
2 is indifferent between x2 and w2 + c1e, and similarly, agent 1 is indifferent between x1
and w1+ c2e. Given that the concessions are the same, c ≡ c1 = c2, they must satisfy the
following equality:
u1(w1 + ce) = max(z1,z2) u1(z1)
s.t. u2(z2) ≥ u2(w2 + ce)
z1 + z2 ≤ w1 + w2.
The solution to this equation is given by the maximal real number c (which is non-
negative) that satisfies:
(u1(w1 + ce), u2(w2 + ce)) ∈ A(E)
Since preferences are strictly increasing and the sets Ai(u) are bounded, the previous
c exists and is unique. Note that the concession in the OSV depends on the initial
endowments. The OSV for the two-agent economy consists of the efficient allocations
(x1, x2) such that u1(x1) = u1(w1 + ce) and u2(x2) = u2(w2 + ce). When preferences are
strictly quasiconcave, the OSV allocation is unique.
OSV for notational simplicity.
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For the two-agent economy the OSV has a very natural graphical representation.
Figure 1 depicts the OSV when n = 2 and there are two commodities.
[Insert Figure 1]
For two-agent economies, our proposal bears many similarities to two previous solu-
tion concepts. First, it is similar to the Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent (PEEE)
allocation proposed by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978), when addressing the issue of al-
locating a bundle of goods among a set of agents. The OSV allocation when the two
agents have the same initial endowments is a PEEE allocation as well. Note that by
choosing different commodity bundles to concede with, we can generate a family of OSV
allocations, all of which are PEEE.
Nicolò and Perea (2004) also propose an ordinal solution concept for two-person bar-
gaining situations. Their construction yields the OSV for the class of exchange economies
where aggregate endowments of all the commodities are equal and are shared equally
among the two agents. Furthermore, while we require indifference with respect to adding
to the two agents initial endowments, multiples of e, they require indifference with re-
spect to adding to each agent’s initial endowment a multiple of the other agent’s initial
endowment.
5 Existence of the OSV
It is not obvious there exists an efficient allocation for which one can find concessions
satisfying the requirements imposed by the definition of the OSV . To show such alloca-
tions exist, we invoke in Theorem 2 a fixed point argument. Furthermore we show that
allocations in the OSV satisfy the desirable property of individual rationality, that is, if
x ∈ OSV ((ºi, wi)i∈N) , then xi ºi wi, for all i ∈ N.
We first prove the following lemma which plays a crucial role in the proof of Theorem
2 and is used in several propositions and comments throughout the paper.
Lemma 1 For any economy E = (ºi, βi)i∈N and any u ∈ A(E), there exists a unique
vector a ∈ Rn that varies continuously with u, such that an OSV allocation for the
n−agent economy (ºi, βi + aie)i∈N yields the utility tuple u.
11
Proof. Lemma 1 is true for n = 1 by monotonicity and continuity of the preferences.
For n ≥ 1, we assume it holds for n − 1 and show it also holds for n. For each j ∈ N,
let (baji )i∈N\j be the unique vector such that the economy with (n− 1) agents with initial
endowments (βi + bajie)i∈N\j has an OSV yielding the (n − 1)−utility tuple u−j with
(baji )i∈N\j being continuous functions of u−j.
To prove the existence of such a vector a ∈ Rn, we propose concessions
¡
cji
¢
i,j∈N,i6=j
and prove that they support an OSV allocation yielding the utility vector u. The proposal
involves the unknowns ai, for i ∈ N, as follows:
cji = −ai + baji for i, j ∈ N, i 6= j.
The proposed concessions must satisfy the “fairness” condition n.2) :X
i∈N\j
cji =
X
i∈N\j
cij for j ∈ N,
yielding, after arrangement, a system of linear equations given by:
(n− 1)aj −
X
i∈N\j
ai =
X
i∈N\j
baij − X
i∈N\j
baji ≡ θj for j ∈ N.
Notice that
P
j∈N
θj = 0. It is then easy to check that the solutions for this system are
all given by the following expressions, where an ∈ R:
ai =
1
n
¡
θi − θn
¢
+ an for i ∈ N.
Denote by ba the only real number such that u is efficient for an economy where
the initial endowments are
¡
βi + 1n
¡
θi − θn
¢
e+ bae¢
i∈N and bx ∈ Rnk a Pareto efficient
allocation in that economy.
We now prove that the allocation bx, is inOSV ((ºi, βi+aie)i∈N), with ai = 1n ¡θi − θn¢+ba, and the concessions cji = −ai + baji for i, j ∈ N, i 6= j supporting it (note that since the
θj’s and ba are continuous functions of the u0is, so are the cj0i s.).
First, take any set of (n − 1) agents, say N\j. An economy where these agents have
initial endowments
¡
βi + aie
¢
i∈N\j and receive concessions
¡
cji
¢
i∈N\j is identical, by con-
struction, to an economy where agents’ initial endowments are
¡
βi + bajie¢i∈N\j. Hence,
there is an OSV allocation for this (n−1)−agent economy where agent i’s utility is ui, for
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all i ∈ N\j. This corresponds to the n.1) requirement in the definition of an OSV alloca-
tion for the n−agent economy. Furthermore, by construction, requirement n.2) is satisfied
for the concessions
¡
cji
¢
i,j∈N,i6=j . Finally, note that bx is efficient for the n−agent economy
with initial endowments
¡
βi + aie
¢
i∈N,i6=j and that it generates utility levels given by u.
To complete the proof of Lemma 1, we show that if an OSV allocation for the econ-
omy (ºi, βi + aie)i∈N yields the utility tuple u, then a = a. Denote by (cji )i,j∈N,i6=j the
concessions associated with this OSV allocation. For any j ∈ N, define now the vectorbaj ∈ Rn−1 by baji ≡ ai + cji , for i ∈ N\j. The economy where agents’ initial endowments
are (βi + bajie)i∈N\j is identical, by construction, to the economy with initial endowments
(βi + aie)i∈N\j when the concessions are (c
j
i )i∈N\j. Therefore, an OSV allocation for the
(n− 1)−agent economy (βi + bajie)i∈N\j yields the utility tuple u−j. The induction argu-
ment then implies that baji = baji for all i ∈ N\j. Moreover, this argument applies to all
j ∈ N. Therefore,
ai + c
j
i = ai + c
j
i for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j.
By summing, we obtain:X
j∈N\i
(ai + c
j
i )−
X
j∈N\i
(aj + cij) =
X
j∈N\i
(ai + c
j
i )−
X
j∈N\i
(aj + cij) for all i ∈ N.
By the fairness condition of both matrixes c and c, and rearranging, we obtain
n(ai − ai) =
X
j∈N
aj −
X
j∈N
aj for all i ∈ N.
Therefore, the sign of the difference ai − ai is independent of i. Assume, without loss of
generality, that ai > ai for all i ∈ N . In this case, the n agents have more resources in
the economy (βi+ aie)i∈N than in the economy (βi+ aie)i∈N , in contradiction to u being
efficient for both economies.
In the following theorem we use Lemma 1 to construct a mapping, the fixed points of
which, constitute the set of utilities achieved in OSV allocations.
Theorem 2 The Ordinal Shapley Value is non empty and satisfies individual rationality
in economic environments.
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Proof. The proof proceeds by induction. The results hold for n = 1. We assume the
results hold for any economy with up to (n− 1) agents and prove that they hold for any
economy with n agents, for n ≥ 2.
We consider the economy (ºi, wi)i∈N . We proceed to construct a continuous mapping
from a suitably set of bounded utility profiles for this economy into itself. Let ui =
ui(wi − e). The set of utility profiles that constitute the domain (as well as range) of the
mapping is denoted by H, and defined by:
H ≡ {u ∈ Rn | ∃ a Pareto efficient allocation (xi)i∈N ∈ Rnk
with ui(xi) = ui and ui ≥ ui for i = 1, ..., n}.
We prove that the set H is homeomorphic to the unit simplex. To show it, we take
the following utility representation: bui(x) = ui(x)− ui(wi − e) and let:
bH ≡ {u ∈ Rn | ∃ a Pareto efficient allocation (xi)i∈N ∈ Rnk
with bui(xi) = ui and bui ≥ 0 for i = 1, ..., n}.
H and bH are clearly homeomorphic and we show that bH is homeomorphic to the
(n− 1)−unit simplex.
In economic environments, bH is a compact set (it is bounded by assumption and
it is closed since u is continuous, due to the continuity of preferences). Let S be the
(n− 1)−unit simplex in Rn. For each s ∈ S define the two following sets: Ks = {α ∈ R |
αs ≤ h for some h ∈ bH} andKs = {α ∈ R | αs ≥ h for some h ∈ bH}. By the definition of
the ui’s, Ks is not empty. Since bH is bounded Ks is also not empty. Both sets are closed
given that bH is compact. Finally, since the union of Ks and Ks is R, their intersection
is non-empty, and by the definition of bH it must be a singleton which we denote by αs.
Hence, we have shown that for each s ∈ S there exists a unique αs such that αss ∈ bH.
We now consider the function f : S → bH defined by: f(s) = αss with αs ∈ R satisfying
αss ∈ bH. By reversing the arguments used above, the inverse of f exists as well. In fact,
f−1(u) = u?n
i=1 ui
for all u ∈ bH. We now show that f is continuous. Let sn → s, with
sn ∈ S for all n = 1, 2, ..., and assume by way of contradiction that f(sn) 9 f(s). SincebH is compact there must in this case be a sequence ni for which f(sni) → β 6= f(s).
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Moreover, f(sni) = αnisni hence β = (limi→∞ αni) s 6= αss. However since both αss and
(limi→∞ αni) s belong to bH (because bH is closed) it must be that (limi→∞ αni) s = αss (by
the definition of bH) leading to a contradiction. Hence, f(sn)→ f(s) and f is continuous.
Similarly f−1 is continuous as well and we have shown that bH is homeomorphic to the
(n− 1)−unit simplex. (See Proposition 4.6.1 in Mas-Colell, 1985, for a similar result).
We now return to the construction of the mapping from H into H. We denote by Hb
the “border” of H, the set of all the utility vectors for which the ith component equals ui
for some i. Formally,
Hb ≡ {u ∈ H/ ui = ui for some i ∈ N} .
For any vector u ∈ H, we look at u−j ∈ Rn−1 for all j ∈ N. Lemma 1 provides for
each u−j a unique vector aj ∈ Rn−1 such that an OSV allocation for the (n− 1)−agent
economy (ºi, wi + ajie)i∈N/j yields the utility tuple u−j. We let cji (u) ≡ aji . These are the
concessions that agent j “needs” to make in order for the other n − 1 agents to achieve
the utility level u−j.
Using the concessions
¡
cji (u)
¢
j,i∈N,j 6=i we construct n “net concessions” corresponding
to u by:
Ci(u) ≡
X
j∈N\i
cij(u)−
X
j∈N\i
cji (u), for all i ∈ N.
Notice that
P
i∈N
Ci(u) = 0.
We now define a mapping from H into H. Each utility profile u in H is mapped to a
utility profile u ∈ H by increasing (decreasing) the components associated with positive
(negative) Ci(u)s, making necessary adjustments to preserve feasibility and efficiency.
More precisely, we let
D(u) ≡ min
i∈N, Ci(u)<0
{ui − ui} if C(u) 6= 0 ∈ Rn.
D(u) ≡ 0 otherwise.
Note that, if u is not in Hb (that is, if u is at the “interior” of H) then D(u) > 0 if
C(u) 6= 0.
Consider the following vector:
eu(u) ≡ u+ D(u)
max
i∈N
{|Ci(u)|}+ 1C(u) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
u1
...
un
⎞
⎟⎟⎠+
D(u)
max
i∈N
{|Ci(u)|}+ 1
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
C1(u)
...
Cn(u)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
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Denote by C(u)+ ∈ Rn the vector defined as follows: Ci(u)+ = Ci(u) if Ci(u) > 0, and
Ci(u)+ = 0 if Ci(u) ≤ 0. Similarly, denote by C(u)− ∈ Rn the vector that is defined by
Ci(u)− = Ci(u) if Ci(u) < 0, and Ci(u)− = 0 if Ci(u) ≥ 0.
If eu(u) is feasible and efficient, take u(u) = eu(u).
If eu(u) is feasible but not efficient, take
u(u) = u+
D(u)
max
i∈N
{|Ci(u)|}+ 1(C(u)− δC(u)−),
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the unique real number such that u(u) previously defined is feasible
and efficient. (The efficiency requirement implies δ > 0, whereas feasibility implies δ < 1.)
If eu(u) is not feasible, take
u(u) = u+
D(u)
max
i∈N
{|Ci(u)|}+ 1(C(u)− δC(u)+),
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the unique real number such that u(u) previously defined is feasible
and efficient. (Here, feasibility implies δ > 0, whereas efficiency implies δ < 1.)
To prove that u(u) ∈ H, we only need to show that ui(u) ≥ ui for all i. If D(u) = 0,
this property is trivially satisfied. If D(u) > 0 then C(u) 6= 0. By the definition of D(u)
and eu(u), it is easy to check that for i’s for which Ci(u) < 0 the decrease in coordinate i
is small enough so that eu(u)i ≥ ui. Second, if eu(u)i ≥ ui, then the construction of u(u)
makes sure that also u(u)i ≥ ui.
Claim a: The mapping u(u) has a interior fixed point.
To prove the claim, notice first that the mapping u(u) is continuous. Indeed, the
function D(u) is clearly continuous. Also, C(u) is continuous as soon as the “concessions”
cij(u) are a continuous function of u. By Lemma 1, the c
i
j(u)s are a continuous function of
u. Since H is homeomorphic to an n−unit simplex, the mapping u(u) must have a fixed
point. It now remains to show that the fixed point cannot occur on the boundary. We
prove it by the way of contradiction.
Suppose that the fixed point u is on the boundary, that is, u(u)i = ui = ui for some
i ∈ N. Assume, without loss of generality that u1 = u1. We claim that C1(u) > 0. First,
we prove that
P
i∈N\1 c
1
i (u) > 0. Indeed, if
P
i∈N\1 c
1
i (u) ≤ 0, then after the concessions
are made, player 1 obtains at least the utility u1(w1) > u1 since the aggregate endowment
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at the disposal of the others is lower or equal to
P
i∈N\1w
i and the final allocation is
efficient.
Second, for u1 to equal u1 it is necessarily the case that ci1(u) < 0 for all i = 2, ..., n.
Otherwise, the initial endowment of player 1 when i concedes is at least w1 and hence,
because the OSV is individually rational for any environment with (n − 1) agents, his
final utility can not be u1. Therefore, C1(u) > 0 if u1 = u1.
Third, since the previous reasoning holds for every i with ui = ui, we also know that
D(u) > 0 since ui − ui > 0 as soon as Ci(u) < 0 and Ci(u) < 0 for at least one i ∈ N
given that C1(u) > 0.
Therefore, by the construction of our mapping, the utility tuple u is mapped to a point
with a strictly larger utility level for agent 1 and cannot constitute a fixed point. This
proves Claim a.
Claim b: A utility tuple u is a fixed point of the function u if and only if there exists
an allocation x ∈ OSV ((ºi, wi)i∈N) such that u(x) = u.
To prove the claim, let u be a fixed point of the previous mapping, x the feasible
allocation that yields the utility level u, and c the matrix constructed using Lemma 1
(for simplicity, we write c, C, and D instead of c(u), C(u), and D(u)). We claim that
c is the matrix of concessions that support x as an OSV allocation. Given the way we
constructed c, each agent is indifferent with respect to the identity of the conceding agent.
Requirement n.1) of the definition of the OSV is then immediately seen to hold. Also
requirement n.2) holds since, by interiority of the fixed point, D > 0 if Cj < 0 for some
j ∈ N. In an interior fixed point, Cj = 0 for all j ∈ N. Therefore, the concessions satisfyP
i∈N\j c
j
i =
P
i∈N\j c
i
j for all j ∈ N .
Notice also that the utility corresponding to any OSV allocation is a fixed point of our
mapping by construction. Therefore, the set of utilities generated by the OSV allocations
coincides with the set of fixed points of the mapping u(u).
To complete the proof of the theorem we show that every OSV allocation is individ-
ually rational for the economy (ºi, wi)i∈N . Assume by way of contradiction that agent
i receives a bundle strictly worse than wi in an element of OSV ((ºi, wi)i∈N). It must
then be that
P
i∈N\j c
i
j > 0, hence
P
i∈N\j c
j
i > 0 as well. This however means that there
exists a j 6= i for which cji > 0. Hence if agent j concedes, agent i is in an environment
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with n − 1 agents and initial endowment wi + cjie which is strictly larger than wi. By
the induction assumption, any OSV allocation for this environment would be preferred
to wi + cjie, hence strictly preferred to w
i. This is in contradiction to the original OSV
allocation yielding an outcome worse than wi for agent i.
This concludes the proof that the OSV exists and is individually rational.
The proof of Theorem 2 uses a fixed point argument, it does not provide an algorithm
to calculate theOSV in a particular economy, and yields no information regarding the pos-
sible uniqueness of the solution in particular environments. There is, however, much more
information regarding the concessions associated with OSV allocations. First, Lemma
1 implies that the matrix associated with any OSV allocation is unique. Indeed, let
x ∈ OSV ((ºi, wi)i∈N) and ui ≡ ui(xi) for all i ∈ N. For every j ∈ N, Lemma 1 says that
there exists a unique vector cj ∈ Rn−1 such that an allocation inOSV
¡
(ºi, wi + cjie)i∈N\j
¢
yields the utility tuple u−j. That is, there exists a unique matrix of concessions supporting
x. Second, if we identify an allocation in the OSV, then the proof of Lemma 1 indicates
how to construct the unique matrix of concessions associated with this allocation.
Finally we consider the following example which has also been analyzed in Hart (1985,
example 5.7). The economic environment consists of three agents (1, 2, 3) and three com-
modities (x1, x2, x3) where preferences for non-negative consumptions and initial endow-
ments are given by:7
u1(x11, x
1
2, x
1
3) = x
1
1 + x
1
2 w
1 = (2, 2, 0)
u2(x21, x
2
2, x
2
3) = 0.5x
2
1 + x
2
3 w
2 = (2, 0, 2)
u3(x31, x
3
2, x
3
3) = x
3
2 + x
3
3 w
3 = (0, 2, 2)
TheOSV outcome for this environment (it also happens to be unique) is the allocation:
x1 = (4, 0.3791, 0);x2 = (0, 0, 3.2745);x3 = (0, 1.6209, 2.725)
7The utility functions, as given in Hart (1985) are defined just over the non-negative orthant. Note
that in our set up the utility functions need to be defined over all of Rk. This can be accomplished in
several ways without affecting the OSV outcome. One option is to let the utility function equal −∞
for all points outside the non-negative orthant. Alternately (to preserve continuity) the ui’s could be
redefined by:
u1(x11,x
1
2,x
1
3) = min{x11,2x11}+min{x12,2x12}+min{0,2x13}
and similarly for the other two agents.
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and the concessions supporting the outcome are:
c12 = c
2
1 = 0.129 09; c
1
3 = c
3
1 = 0.119 28; c
2
3 = c
3
2 = 0.112 74.
The associated utility profile is (u1, u2, u3) = (4.3791, 3.2745, 4.3464). Note the Shapley
value yields the utility profile (4.5, 3.5, 4) whereas the Harsanyi value yields the utility
profile (13/3, 10/3, 13/3).
6 Characteristics of the OSV
By definition, the OSV allocations satisfy some fairness and consistency properties. Also,
Theorem 2 shows that they are individually rational. The OSV allocations however sat-
isfy several additional appealing properties. The main result of this section provides a
characterization of the OSV in terms of coalitional dividends similar to the characteriza-
tion obtained for the Shapley value. The first step towards this result is to show that the
fact that concessions in the previous example are symmetric is not a coincidence. The
concessions supporting OSV allocations are always symmetric as stated in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 If the concession matrix c supports an OSV allocation, then cij = c
j
i for
all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction. It is true for any economy with n = 2 agents
by the fairness condition. We assume the property is satisfied for every economy with n−1,
with n ≥ 3, agents and show it also holds for (ºi, wi)i∈N . Let x ∈ OSV ((ºi, wi)i∈N),
and let (cij)i,j∈N,i6=j and u ∈ Rn be the concessions supporting x and the utility tuple
associated with it. For any agent i ∈ N , there must exist some OSV allocation (denoted
by y(i)) for the (n − 1)−agent economy (ºj, wj + cije)j∈N\i yielding the utility profile
u−i. Similarly, for any agent k ∈ N\i there must exist an OSV allocation (denoted by
y(ki)) for the (n − 2)−agent economy (ºj, wj + (cij + ckij )e)j∈N\{i,k} yielding the utility
profile u−{i,k}, where (ckij )k,j∈N\i,k 6=j ∈ R(n−1)(n−2) supports y(i). By Lemma 1 there exists
a unique vector a ∈ Rn−2 such that an OSV allocation for the (n−2)−agent economy (ºj
, wj+aje)j∈N\{i,k} yields the utility tuple u−{i,k}. Hence we have wj+aje = wj+(cij+c
ki
j )e
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for any three distinct agents i, j, k ∈ N. By permuting the roles of i and k we obtain:
cij + c
ki
j = c
k
j + c
ik
j for any three distinct agents i, j, k ∈ N. (5)
Hence, c12 + c
31
2 = c
3
2 + c
13
2 , c
3
1 + c
23
1 = c
2
1 + c
32
1 , and c
2
3 + c
12
3 = c
1
3 + c
21
3 . Moreover, by the
induction assumption, concessions are symmetric for any economy with (n − 1) agents,
hence c312 = c
21
3 , c
13
2 = c
23
1 , and c
32
1 = c
12
3 . Using this property and summing the three
previous equations, we obtain:
(c31 − c13) + (c12 − c21) + (c23 − c32) = 0.
We can repeat the same argument with agent 3 replaced by agents 4, ..., n. Summing up
all the equalities, we get:
{(c31 − c13) + ...+ (cn1 − c1n)}+ (n− 2)(c12 − c21) + {(c23 − c32) + ...+ (c2n − cn2)} = 0.
Using the fairness requirement n.2) we get:
(c12 − c21) + (n− 2)(c12 − c21) + (c12 − c21) = 0.
Hence, c12 = c
2
1.
Similarly it can be shown that cij = c
j
i for any i, j ∈ N, i 6= j.
The following theorem provides a characterization of the OSV analogous to the char-
acterization of the Shapley value in terms of coalitional dividends.
Theorem 3 Let Φ be a correspondence that associates a set of efficient allocations to
every economic environment (ºi, wi)i∈N . Suppose that it satisfies property (Q):
(Q) For all x ∈ Φ((ºi, wi)i∈N) and ui ≡ ui(xi) for all i ∈ N, there exists a vector
(λS)S⊆N ∈ R2
n
such that
ui
⎛
⎜⎝wi + di(T )e+
X
S3i
S⊆T
λSe
⎞
⎟⎠ = ui for all T ⊆ N , for all i ∈ T, (6)
where d(T ) ∈ R|T | is a vector such that an element of the set Φ((ºj, wj + dje)j∈T ) yields
the utility tuple uT .
Then, Φ is a sub-correspondence of the OSV correspondence.
Moreover, the OSV correspondence satisfies property (Q).
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Proof. The proof of both claims proceeds by induction. First we show that Φ is a
sub-correspondence of the OSV correspondence. When n = 1, the result holds trivially.
We assume now that the result holds for up to n−1 agents and show it holds for n agents,
n ≥ 2.
Take x ∈ Φ((ºi, wi)i∈N) and let (λS)S⊆N ∈ R2
n
be the vector associated with x.
Consider the matrix c ∈ RnxRn−1 defined by cji =
P
S3i,j
S⊆N
λS. We claim that the matrix c
supports x as an OSV allocation. First, given that cji = c
i
j for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, condition
n.2) of Definition 1 is satisfied. Second, to prove condition n.1), take any j ∈ N and
consider the economy (ºi, wi + cjie)i∈N\j. Notice that since
ui
⎛
⎜⎝wi +
X
S3i
S⊆N
λSe
⎞
⎟⎠ = ui = ui
⎛
⎜⎜⎝w
i + bi(N\j)e+
X
S3i
S⊆N\j
λSe
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ for all i ∈ N\j,
it happens that
bi(N\j) =
X
S3i,j
S⊆N
µλS = c
j
i for all i ∈ N\j.
Therefore, the utility tuple u−j is attainable (and efficient) in the economy (ºi, wi +
cjie)i∈N\j since it is attainable (and efficient) in (ºi, wi + bi(N\j)e)i∈N\j . Denote by y(j)
the efficient allocation that yields u−j. Since for all T ⊆ N\j,
¡
bi(T )− cji
¢
i∈T is a vector
such that an element of the set Φ((ºj, wj + cjie+[bj(T )− cji ]e)j∈T ) yields the utility tuple
u−j, the induction hypothesis ensures that y(j) ∈ OSV ((ºi, wi + cjie)i∈N\j). This proves
condition n.1) and concludes the proof that x is an OSV allocation.
We now show that the OSV allocation satisfies property Q. If N = {i}, then λ{i}
exists and is unique: λ{i} = 0. Suppose the result holds for any economy with at most
n− 1 agents, for n ≥ 2. Let x ∈ OSV ((ºi, wi)i∈N) and ui ≡ ui(xi) for all i ∈ N. Denote
by
¡
cij
¢
i,j∈N,i6=j the concessions supporting x as an OSV allocation and, for all j ∈ N, let
y(j) be such that y(j) ∈ OSV ((ºi, wi + cjie)i∈N\j) and y(j)i ∼i xi for all i ∈ N\j.
Applying the induction argument, for all j ∈ N, there exists a unique (λS(j))S⊆N\j ∈
R2
n−1
such that:
ui
⎛
⎜⎝wi + cjie+ di(T ; j)e+
X
S3i
S⊆T
λS(j)e
⎞
⎟⎠ = ui for all T ⊆ N\j, for all i ∈ T,
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where d(T ; j) ∈ R|T | is the unique vector such that an element of the set OSV ((ºj
, wj + cjie + di(T ; j)e)j∈T ) yields the utility tuple uT . We first claim that λS(j) = λS(k)
for all S ⊆ N\{j, k}. Indeed, consider the economy (ºi, wi)i∈S and the unique vector
d(S) ∈ R|S| such that an element of OSV ((ºi, wi + di(S)e)i∈S) yields the utility tuple
uS. By the induction argument, there is a unique vector (λB)B⊆S ∈ R2
|S|
such that
ui
⎛
⎜⎝wi + di(T )e+
X
B3i
B⊆T
λBe
⎞
⎟⎠ = ui for all T ⊆ S, for all i ∈ T.
Since the vector d(T ) is unique, it is immediate that di(T ) = c
j
i + di(T ; j) = c
k
i + di(T ; k)
for all T ⊆ S, i ∈ T. And since the vector (λB)B⊆S is unique, it is also immediate that
λS = λS(j) = λS(k).
According to the previous claim, we can propose λS (= λS(j) for any j /∈ S) for any
S ⊂ N. With the vector (λS)S⊂N , the equality ui
µ
wi + di(T )e+
P
S3i
S⊆T
λSe
¶
= ui holds
for all T ⊂ N and for all i ∈ T. Moreover, the vector for which the equality happens is
unique. The unique value still to be found is λN .
For any i ∈ N, consider the value λN(i) implicitly (and uniquely) defined by:
ui
⎛
⎜⎝wi +
X
S3i
S⊂N
λSe+ λN(i)e
⎞
⎟⎠ = ui.
We complete the proof if we show that λN(i) = λN(j) for any i, j ∈ N. By induction, for
any i, j ∈ N :
ui
⎛
⎜⎜⎝w
i + cjie+
X
S3i
S⊆N\j
λSe
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ = u
i = ui
⎛
⎜⎝wi +
X
S3i
S⊂N
λSe+ λN(i)e
⎞
⎟⎠ ,
hence,
λN(i) = c
j
i +
X
S3i
S⊆N\j
λS −
X
S3i
S⊂N
λS = c
j
i −
X
S⊇{i,j}
S⊂N
λS.
Given the symmetry of the concessions, cji = c
i
j, λN(i) = λN(j) for all i, j ∈ N, which
completes the proof.
22
Therefore, the OSV correspondence is characterized as the union of the correspon-
dences (or as the largest correspondence) that satisfy property (Q). Borrowing the ter-
minology used in TU environments, we refer to the vector (λS)S⊆N as the coalitional
dividends. Although the coalitional dividends are somewhat more complex to define in
our economic environment than they are in TU environments, they reflect the same idea:
if i ∈ S, then λS is the dividend agent i obtains because he belongs to coalition S. Indeed,
given that d(N) = 0, the final utility agent i obtains in the OSV allocation character-
ized by the dividends (λS)S⊆N is u
i = ui
µ
wi +
P
S3i
S⊆N
λSe
¶
. The added difficulty in our
framework is how to measure the value of a coalition, since the additional utility (in terms
of e) that agents in a certain coalition S obtain depends upon the level of their initial
endowment. Theorem 3 shows that the proper reference to measure the increase in utility
is given by the level of utility at the OSV allocation. In TU environments, the reference
point is not important since the value of the coalition does not depend on the initial
endowment.
It is interesting to point out that the relationship between the coalitional dividends that
exists for every OSV allocation and the concessions matrix that supports this allocation,
is the same as the one that exists for the Shapley value in TU environments (that was
proved in Section 2). It is easy to see that d(N\j) = (cji )i∈N\j for any j ∈ N. Therefore,
applying (6) to the sets N and N\j, we obtain:
ui
⎛
⎜⎝wi +
X
S3i
S⊆N
λSe
⎞
⎟⎠ = ui = ui
⎛
⎜⎜⎝w
i + cjie+
X
S3i
S⊆N\j
λSe
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ for any i ∈ N\j,
hence,
cji =
X
S3i,j
S⊆N
λS for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j.
We conclude this section with two further properties of theOSV . The next proposition
shows that the OSV is monotonic in initial endowments.
Proposition 4 Consider an economic environment (ºi, wi)i∈N where ºj≡ºk and wj ≥
(>)wk for some j 6= k. Then, xj ºj (Âj)xk for any x ∈ OSV ((ºi, wi)i∈N).
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Proof. The proof proceeds by induction. Consider first the case of two agents (n = 2)
and assume º1≡º2 .Let u represent the preferences of both agents. The unique level of
utility that they achieve in the OSV allocations is:
Max
c∈R+
¡
u(w1 + ce), u(w2 + ce)
¢ ¯¯¡
u(w1 + ce), u(w2 + ce)
¢
∈ A
ª
.
It is then immediate that w1 ≥ w2 implies x1 º1 x2, for x = OSV ((ºi, wi)i=1,2).Moreover,
x1 is strictly preferred to x2 if w1 is strictly greater than w2.
We assume now that the property holds for economies with up to n − 1 agents, for
n ≥ 3. We prove, by contradiction, that it also holds for economies with n agents.
Without loss of generality, suppose º1≡º2, w1 ≥ w2, and x1 ≺1 x2 for some x ∈
OSV ((ºi, wi)i∈N). (For notational convenience, we do the proof for the case w1 ≥ w2;
the proof is similar when w1 > w2.) Using property n.1) in the definition of an OSV
allocation, let y(1) ∈ OSV ((ºi, wi + c1i e)i∈N\1) be such that ui(y(1)i) = ui(xi) for all
i ∈ N\1, and y(2) ∈ OSV ((ºi, wi + c2i e)i∈N\2) be such that ui(y(2)i) = ui(xi) for all
i ∈ N\2.
Given that ui(y(1)i) = ui(y(2)i) for all i ∈ N\{1, 2}, u1(y(2)1) < u2(y(1)2), º1≡º2,
and the efficiency of the allocations y(1) and y(2), it must be the case that the total
initial resources in the economy (ºi, wi + c1i e)i∈N\1 are larger than in the economy (ºi
, wi + c2i e)i∈N\2. That is, X
i∈N\1
c1i >
X
i∈N\2
c2i .
By symmetry, c12 = c
2
1, c
1
i = c
i
1 and c
2
i = c
i
2 for all i ∈ N\{1, 2}. Therefore,X
i∈N\{1,2}
ci1 >
X
i∈N\{1,2}
ci2.
Let k ∈ N\{1, 2} be such that ck1 > ck2, and y(k) ∈ OSV ((ºi, wi+ cki e)i∈N\k) be such that
ui(y(k)i) = ui(xi) for all i ∈ N\k. In the (n− 1)−agent economy ((ºi, wi + cki e)i∈N\k), it
happens that º1≡º2 and w1 + ck1e > w2 + ck2e. By the induction hypothesis, u1(y(k)1) ≥
u2(y(k)2), that is, u1(x1) ≥ u2(x2). This is in contradiction to our original hypothesis.
The next property, anonymity of the OSV is an immediate corollary of the previous
proposition.
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Corollary 2 Consider an economic environment (ºi, wi)i∈N where ºj≡ºk and wj =
wk for some j 6= k. Then, xj vj xk for any x ∈ OSV ((ºi, wi)i∈N). Moreover, if the
preferences of agents j and k are strictly quasiconcave, then xj = xk for any x ∈ OSV ((ºi
, wi)i∈N).
7 The weighted OSV
Shapley (1953b) extends the Shapley TU value by considering nonsymmetric divisions
of the surplus. He defines the (now called) weighted Shapley value by stipulating an
exogenously given system of weights q ∈ Rn++, assigning each agent i the share qi/
P
j∈N qj
of the unit in each unanimity game, and defining the value as the linear extension of this
operator to the set of TU games. There exist several characterizations of the weighted
Shapley value. The next proposition states, without a proof, a new characterization,
similar to the one provided in Corollary 1.8
Proposition 5 A value ξ is the q−weighted Shapley value if and only if for each game
(N, v) there exists a matrix of concessions c(N, v) ≡ (cij(N, v))i,j∈N,i6=j, with cij(N, v) in
R for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, such that:
(1) ξi(N, v) = ξi(N\j, v) + cji (N, v) for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, and
(2)
P
i∈N\j
qjcji (N, v) =
P
i∈N\j
qicij(N, v) for all j ∈ N.
Following the same route we took in defining the OSV , we can define a weighted value
for economic environments where the weights of the agents are taken into account. We
now describe an extension of the OSV which yields the q− weighted OSV (q − wOSV )
solution, which reduces to the q− weighted Shapley value in economic environments that
can be described as a TU environment. The only difference with respect to the definition
of the OSV lies in the “fairness” condition n.2) :
Definition 2 We define the q− weighted Ordinal Shapley Value recursively.
(n = 1) In the case of an economy with one agent with preferences º1 and initial
endowments a1 ∈ Rk, the q − wOSV is given by the initial endowment: q − wOSV (º1
, a1) = {a1} .
8For interpretation, see also Section 4 in Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001).
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Suppose that the solution has been defined for any economy with (n−1) or less agents.
(n) In the case of an economy (ºi, ai)i∈N with a set N of n agents, the q−wOSV ((ºi, ai)i∈N)
is the set of efficient allocations (xi)i∈N for which there exists an n−tuple of concession
vectors (ci)i∈N that satisfy
n.1) for all j ∈ N, there exists y(j) ∈ q − wOSV
¡
(ºi, ai + cjie)i∈N\j
¢
such that xi ∼i
y(j)i for all i ∈ N\j, and
n.2)
P
i∈N\j
qjcji =
P
i∈N\j
qicij for all j ∈ N.
It is worthwhile to notice that the “weighted fairness” condition n.2), together with the
“consistency” requirement n.1) also imply in this case that the concessions that support
the q−wOSV are “weighted” symmetric, in that we have qjcji = qicij for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j.
Moreover, very small changes in the proof of Theorem 2 are needed, to establish existence
and individual rationality of this value, for any economic environment, which we state as:
Theorem 4 The q−weighted Ordinal Shapley Value is non empty and satisfies individual
rationality in economic environments, for any q ∈ Rn++.
8 Conclusion
This paper addressed the problem of sharing a joint surplus among the agents creating it.
We looked for a solution associating with each economic environment (agents described
by preferences and endowments) a set of outcomes (allocations of the aggregate endow-
ment across the agents). We showed there exists such an (ordinal) solution that satisfies
efficiency and suitably defined notions of consistency and fairness. This solution being a
natural extension of the Shapley value to general environments (NTU games).was called
an Ordinal Shapley value.
The OSV provided not just an allocation but also a matrix of concessions “measuring”
the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. Further analysis showed these
concessions were symmetric, what agent i concedes to agent j coincides with the concession
of agent j to agent i. This symmetry property reduces to the balanced contributions
property of the Shapley Value for TU games. The next stage of the analysis characterized
the OSV in terms of coalitional dividends. We further showed that the OSV satisfies
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monotonicity in initial endowments and anonymity. Finally, we constructed a family of
q−weighted OSV ’s, which are the ordinal counterparts (in our setting) to the family of
q−weighted Shapley values for TU games.
The main advantage of this extension compared to previous attempts to extend the
value is the fact it is ordinal. It is also defined in the commodity space rather in the
“utility” space, whereas several previous ordinal values were defined solely on the utility
space (Safra and Samet, 2004).
Since it exists for a large class of environments it can be used to address a variety of
distributional issues dispensing of the need to assume quasi-linear preferences or convexity
of preferences. Problems of allocating joint costs can be handled as well without restricting
the environment through the quasi-linearity in “money” assumption or convexity of the
cost function.
The OSV approach allowing for different reference bundles generates a family of out-
comes. A similar phenomenon is given by the family of PEEE allocations in Pazner
and Schmeidler (1978) where conceivably different allocations are obtained by choosing
different rays along which the search for an allocation proceeds.
Further research should clarify the connections between theOSV and other well-known
ordinal solution concepts like the core and competitive equilibria outcomes. More research
is also needed to determine what happens to the set of OSV allocations as the economy
grows and\or more restrictions are imposed on the preferences. The implementability of
the OSV remains the topic of further work as well.
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Figure 1: The solution in the two-agent economy.
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